David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a "combinatorial-state automaton" or CSA. It is not entirely clear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a full-blown computational model, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent algorithms, and because they are too powerful both in that they can perform any computation in a single step and in that without so far unspecified restrictions they can "compute" the uncomputable. In addition, I suggest that finite, inputless CSAs have trivial implementations very similar to those they were introduced to avoid.
1 Searle writes: "For any program and any sufficiently complex object, there is some description of the object under which it is implementing the program. Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar" (Searle 1991, pp. 208-209) .
2 Sometimes this is treated as a pair of functions, one from pairs of an input state and an internal state to the succeeding internal state, and one from internal states to outputs. any earlier state. The second condition is that the system has what Chalmers calls a "dial," which simply means that the system has a component that can be in many different states such that when the dial is in a particular state it tends to remain in that state, and the dial states do not affect the operation of the clock. This could be a literal dial or counter (unconnected to anything else), or we could simply treat a system as including marks we could draw on it, for example tally marks.
Suppose we now want to construct a physical implementation of the following simple FSA. 
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For vividness, our implementation will consist of an actual digital clock with a manually adjustable dial attached to the top. We will set the dial to 1, start the clock at 12:00, and let it run for a few minutes. (For simplicity I assume that time progresses digitally in one-minute increments.) We obtain the following sequence of total physical states of our clock-dial combination:
12:00, 1 12:01, 1 12:02, 1 12:03, 1
Now, we also know that, if we had set the dial to 2 or 3 instead of 1, the system would have gone through a sequence of states exactly the same as the sequence it did go through, except for the dial setting. So we also have the following counterfactual dependencies:
abstract state physical states Again his conclusion is that the model is too simple and unstructured. Chalmers writes: "The real moral . . . is that even simple FSAs with inputs and outputs are not constrained enough to capture the kind of complex structure that computation and cognition involve. The trouble is that the internal states of these FSAs are monadic, lacking any internal structure, whereas the internal states of most computational and cognitive systems have all sorts of complex structure" (Chalmers 1996a, p. 324) . Chalmers then introduces a model to attempt to capture this internal structure, the model of the "combinatorial-state automaton," or CSA. The CSA can be described in exactly the same way as an FSA, except that all input states, internal states, and 
Against the CSA as a Computational Model
There are two ways one might interpret the CSA model. First, it could be intended to be a general model of computation, in the same way that Turing machines or register machines are models of computation. Second, it could be intended, not as a computational model in its own right, but as a convenient formalism for redescribing computations from a variety of specific models, in order to be able to state conditions on implementation in a way that will apply to all of them. I will argue that the CSA cannot play the former role, and that, although it may be able to serve the latter, more modest role, this may not be as advantageous as it first appears.
In many ways the former interpretation of the CSA, as a full-fledged computational model, is a very attractive one. There have been many proposals for making the abstract idea of a computation precise, including Turing machines, register machines, abacus machines, Post production systems, and more. All of these have turned out to be equivalent, in the sense that they can compute exactly the same functions. In another sense, though, they are not equivalent: although a Turing machine and a register machine can each compute, say, f (x) = x!, the procedures used to compute the function will be quite different in the two cases. Each specific model of computation suggests a fairly restrictive physical implementation; for example, a Turing machine is thought of as having a read/write head that travels back and forth on a tape that is divided into squares. The idea of a CSA could be seen as abstracting away from such details, offering a completely general account of computation that is not restricted to any particular kind of physical implementation. On this interpretation, the CSA would have two important characteristics: (a) it would respect the differences between different computational models:
the CSA transcription of a TM that computes a given function will be different from the CSA transcription of a register machine that computes the same function. But, unlike the familiar models, (b) it would be general enough to encompass them all. A TM cannot in any natural way be represented as a register machine (although it can be simulated by one), but either can be represented as a CSA. So the CSA seems to provide an attractive way of expressing the core of computation without commitment to any specific kind of physical implementation. of parameters whose values must satisfy certain constraints. 5 The CSA certainly counts as a model in the sense of a set-theoretic construction. But there is no intuitive conception of computation underlying it. As a result, I will suggest in section 3.1, it does not offer a perspicuous way of explaining or understanding computations. The lack of an intuitive picture underlying the set-theoretic construction may also be the reason that the constraints placed on the model
do not yet rule out "computing" the uncomputable, as I will suggest in section 3.2.
First Problem: Lack of Perspicuity
If we consider how to translate a TM description into a CSA description, we may begin to wonder whether something has gone wrong. Consider the following very simple two-state 5 I am drawing here on R. Gregory Taylor's helpful section "What is a Model of Computation?" (Taylor 1998, pp. 342-344) . Taylor suggests that the existing models of computation are so varied that there is no core of essential features common to them all: "the most that can be said is that the various models . . . exhibit certain family resemblances" (Taylor 1998, p. 344 ).
Turing machine. If started on the leftmost of a string of 0 or more 1's, it will move to the right, add a 1, and then move back to the left to halt on the first blank space before the 1's. We could think of it as computing the function f (n) = n + 1. (For simplicity I ignore the usual convention that the head must halt on the leftmost stroke of the resulting block.) Each square will either be blank or contain a 1, and any combination of blanks and 1s will be a possible state of the tape. This gives us eight possible states so far. States must also have a component to represent the internal state of the TM; since our TM has two possible internal states, we now have 8 × 2 = 16 states. Finally, a CSA state needs to indicate the position of the TM's read/write head. The head must be on one and only one square of the tape, so we have a grand total of 16 × 3 = 48 distinct states the CSA can be in.
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In the general case, CSAs may have inputs and outputs as well as internal states. But this is not required to represent a Turing machine. There is no output aside from the final state of the tape. Chalmers suggests that the TM be regarded as having input only once, when it starts, but we can equally well regard it as having no input at all if we treat every state as a starting state, since the input is also simply a distribution of symbols on the tape.
Finally, in addition to state vectors (and input and output vectors if necessary), a CSA must have a state-transition function. Since we do not need inputs and outputs for our TM representation, we can regard this function as simply a function from state vectors to state vectors. A function is simply a set of ordered pairs, so the most obvious way to represent such a function is to list every such pair. Equivalently, we can regard each ordered pair as a state-transition rule stating that its first member must be followed by its second member. Call a description of a CSA by means of such a complete list an exhaustive listing. In the present case we will have 48 such rules, one for each state of the CSA. Table 1 is the exhaustive listing for the Turing machine we are discussing.
The first thing to notice about this listing is that it seems rather long as a way of characterizing a Turing machine that we could describe very briefly and simply! And of course this is the description for a machine with a tape only three squares long; every additional square of tape will double the number of possible states, so that to represent a machine with a tape of, say, 1000 squares, we will need more than 2 1000 states, or around 10 300 , and the same number of state-transition rules in an exhaustive listing.
Another way to get a visual impression of the decrease in perspicuity that results from redescription as a CSA is to consider a state-transition diagram. Notice that our CSA transcription of the simple Turing machine has absorbed the Turing machine's tape into its internal state, so that the CSA has no input or output. 7 But this means that in a sense the CSA just is a giant inputless FSA. We can give the same sort of state-transition diagram for the CSA that we can for an FSA, treating the vectors that constitute the internal states as a way of labeling states of the FSA. The state-transition diagram of the machine we are considering consists of a number of non-intersecting diagrams. Many of these are one-or two-state dead ends; these are shown 2 ] in Figure 1 . 8 Figure 2 shows If we have an infinite CSA representing our TM with an infinite tape, then we will have all the information we need to determine what mathematical function is being computed. In this case, it may still be reasonable to say that the CSA does not represent an algorithm at all; certainly it does not represent one perspicuously. The information about the TM algorithm is present only in the same way that the laws of motion and gravitation would be present in a complete description of all the possible trajectories of objects in the universe. We have a
complete listing of what the TM will do under every possible circumstance, but we have no easy or automatic way to determine the general principles that underlie these actions. 
Second Problem: Excessive Power
Without unspecified restrictions, CSAs are too powerful to count as a computational model.
There are at least two ways to see this point.
First, recall that Turing machines and other computational models were originally introduced to try to provide a precise interpretation of the idea of an effective procedure or algorithm for computing a function. Turing machines (and other models) have the following property: if we can find a Turing machine that computes a given function, then we have found an effective procedure for computing the function, and the TM description is a description of this procedure. But this is simply not true for CSAs in general. There will always be a CSA which finds the value of a function for any argument in some finite range in a single step. For instance, in the case of the function f (x) = x + 1, which our simple Turing machine computes, we could dispense with the component that lists the position of the TM head, keeping the n components that Second, consider the case of a CSA whose states have an infinite number of components.
Chalmers explicitly allows this, as indeed he must if it is to be possible to have a CSA transcription of a TM with an infinite tape. 9 But now the state-transition function will need to be able to take infinitely many arguments (so that an exhaustive listing would have infinitely many state-transition rules). But once we allow the state-transition function to have infinitely many arguments, it is hard to see how to prevent CSAs from being able to "compute" functions that are in fact not computable! And clearly a model that permits "computation" of uncomputable functions is not a good candidate for a model of computation.
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I hesitate to place too much weight on this point, since Chalmers only briefly mentions infinite CSAs, and he does state that "restrictions have to be placed on the vectors and dependency rules, so that these do not encode an infinite amount of information" (Chalmers 2011, p. 330 ).
Chalmers does not state what these restrictions might be, however. Clearly one way to specify such restrictions would be to require that the CSA conform to the limitations of a Turing machine: the only square that can change is the one the head is on, and the position of the head can only change by one square at a time. But we certainly do not want to impose the constraints specific to Turing machines on the general notion of a CSA, since this would deprive it of its ability to transcribe computational models other than Turing machines.
In some ways the most natural way to limit the class of CSAs to those that compute functions that are "computable" in the usual sense might be to require that there be a way to give a finite specification of the state-transition function. More precisely, it would be natural to require that the state-transition function be effectively computable. But this solution would seem to rob the CSA formalism itself of interest as a computational model, since the work of guaranteeing that what the CSA is doing is computable would in fact be done by an independent conception of computability.
The problem of excessive power can be put in another way. Traditional computational models begin with a highly restricted set of abilities, and then show that more and more complex tasks can be performed by combinations of these basic abilities. It is precisely the fact that complex tasks can be accomplished by complex applications of simple abilities that shows that the tasks are computable. However, the CSA model in a sense moves in the exact opposite direction. It begins with the ability to move from absolutely any state to absolutely any other state, so that to guarantee that only computable functions can be captured, we have to impose restrictions.
Third Problem: Trivial Implementations
The principal advantage of the CSA over the FSA is intended to be that CSAs are not similarly susceptible of trivial implementations, such as the implementations consisting of a clock and a dial considered earlier. Of course, a finite CSA is equivalent to an FSA, as Chalmers himself points out. In fact the state-transition diagram displayed earlier can be construed as that of an inputless FSA. Chalmers's own argument, reviewed earlier, shows that there is a trivial implementation of this inputless FSA by means of a clock and a dial. However, as Chalmers points out, "the implementation conditions on a CSA are much more constrained than those of the corresponding FSA. An implementation of a CSA is required to consist in a complex causal interaction among a number of separate parts; a CSA description can therefore capture the causal organization of a system to a much finer grain" (Chalmers 2011, p. 331 ).
However, if we adopt Chalmers's official definition of implementation for a CSA, without any additional restrictions, it is possible to implement a finite, inputless CSA in a physical system in which there is almost no causal interaction at all between the subcomponents of the system. Consider the following simple modification of Chalmers's technique for finding trivial FSA implementations. Instead of implementing the CSA with a single clock and dial, we will implement a CSA whose states have n components by means of a physical system containing n clocks and n dials. Each component of the overall physical system will include three subcomponents. The first two are the dial and the clock; for each component i from 1
to n the third subcomponent is simply an indicator that displays the numeral i, to distinguish the state of this particular component from that of the other components, which otherwise will be exactly similar. All of the clocks and dials will be linked in such a way that it is physically necessary that they have the same reading; having different readings on different clocks or dials will be physically impossible. One way to achieve this for the clocks, assuming they are sufficiently accurate, is to simply synchronize them before running the system. A crude way to achieve it for the dials, if they were literal dials with a round face and a hand, would be to link all n of the hands with a bar which keeps them synchronized. Obviously more sophisticated means would also be possible. Since each clock-plus-dial-plus-indicator state reliably causes its successor state (a state with the same dial reading, the same state-indicator reading, and an incremented clock reading), it will also be true that each overall state of the n-clocks-dialsand-indicators will reliably cause its successor. We first focus on total states of the physical system, using Chalmers's procedure described in section 2.1 to construct an equivalence class of physical states to correspond to each overall CSA state. readings of all the other components at that time (since they are all required to be the same).
In some ways the basic idea here is similar to one that Chalmers considers (Chalmers 1996a, p. 327) . That strategy is to make the state of each component of an implementing system at a time depend on the states of all of the components at the preceding time. Chalmers points out that this strategy leads to a combinatorial explosion that would quickly require implementing systems to become larger than the known universe. Despite the practical impossibility of such trivial implementations, in the end Chalmers holds that additional (unspecified) constraints on implementation are needed to rule them out (Chalmers 1996a, p. 329) . If the trivial implementations proposed here do in fact meet Chalmers's official definition of implementations of CSAs, however, then the need for such additional constraints is even more pressing than he suggests, since they would appear to be possible in systems that are not wildly large, and whose histories are even more boringly uneventful than those of the systems he considers. It seems quite clear that the physical systems involved are small enough and simple enough to be easily constructed, and that they should not count as an implementations of interesting computations.
definition of implementation appeals only to transition rules that link total states, not to more local or general rules; and in part the fact that in the physical system I propose it is impossible for the dial and clock readings of the various physical substates to differ from one another. One might wonder whether this latter point somehow disqualifies the implementation. But there doesn't seem to be anything in the official definition of CSA implementation which rules out this sort of causal connection between the physical substates of the overall system, and it is not clear what constraint one might add to rule it out. There cannot be a general prohibition on causal connections between subcomponents, since we want the various components of a TM implementation, for example, to interact. Nor can there be a prohibition on causal connections that are not required by the nature of the abstract machine being implemented; for instance, in a crude physical implementation of a TM, there can surely be no objection to the read-write head compressing the square of the tape it rests on, even though this is not required by the abstract specification of the TM. We might wonder whether we should require that any of the physical states that map to S 1 1 should be combinable with any of the physical states that map to S 2 1 , and so on. But this seems far too strong a requirement. Perhaps we could implement a Turing machine on a PC in such a way that the contents of the tape can be stored either in RAM or on the hard drive. Then for every square there would be two ways to implement the state in which the square contains a stroke. But it might be impossible to combine the first implementation of square 1 containing a stroke with the second implementation of square 2 containing a stroke:
perhaps the contents of the entire tape must be stored in the same location.
My first two criticisms of the CSA model focused on the abstract model itself, emphasizing the need for additional constraints on this abstract model. My guess is that the way to avoid trivial implementations, however, is different. Chalmers describes the root idea of his account of implementation as the idea that there is an isomorphism between "the formal structure" of the abstract computation, and "the causal structure" of the physical system that implements it.
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11 As Cocos (2002, p. 44 ) stresses, the definite description "the causal structure" is misleading, since (as We normally think of implementation as a relation between abstract structures and concrete physical processes. But of course isomorphism is a relation between abstract set-theoretic structures. The "causal structure" of a physical system is still a set-theoretic structure, a set of states or equivalence classes of states together with relations on those states. I wonder whether the most difficult part of the relation between abstract computations and concrete processes may turn out to be, not the relation between formal structures and causal structures, but rather the relation between causal structures and concrete physical processes. I also wonder whether, once an adequate account of when a physical system has a given causal structure has been developed, it will rule out even the simple clock-dial implementations of FSAs with which we began.
4 The CSA as a Transcription Device I have argued that the CSA does not constitute a computational model in its own right, at least as presently described. (It is possible that a revised version with restrictions imposed on the allowable states and transitions might be.) It is entirely possible, however, that it was not Chalmers's intention to provide such an account. It may be that he intends the second interpretation mentioned above, construing the CSA merely as a convenient formalism into which more specific abstract machines can be translated.
If this were the case, then, since each TM state-transition rule (for instance) corresponds to a large number of CSA state-transitions (in fact an infinite number if we are representing a TM with an infinite tape), we could abandon the exhaustive listing as a way of characterizing a CSA, and translate each TM rule by a universal quantification over CSA states. Some sentences in "Rock" appear to suggest something like this: Chalmers mentions that "often the statetransitions of a CSA will be defined in terms of local dependencies, as when a substate depends only on a few neighboring substates and perhaps on a few inputs rather than on the entire Chalmers recognizes) the same physical system will have many causal structures.
previous state and input vectors," and goes on to note that in such a case "we can require that the appropriate restricted conditional holds: that is, if the physical system is in the (few) specified previous substates and receiving the specified inputs, this causes it to transit appropriately" (Chalmers 1996a, p. 325) .
For the example we have been considering, we could say that the function that maps a state S onto its successor S ′ is the unique function such that:
